What if the War Isn’t Winnable?

Okay, y’all (how’s that spelling?) asked for more politics (or at least that’s what I wanted to hear), so…

I’ve been thinking about what happens when a society goes to war for a limited objective but then comes to face what seems to be an unlimited cost.

The more blood and treasure the society spends on the war, the harder it becomes to acknowledge that the war can’t be won. After spending so much, a pull-out would be painful: the society would have to acknowledge that the entire enterprise — the lives lost, the money spent — was a waste (worse than a waste, really, because of opportunity costs and unintended consequences).

Any society would want to avoid the pain inherent in such acknowledgment. The society would prefer to believe there is still some chance of winning. If victory is possible, then even though the victory turned out to be costlier than first believed, at least the society would have something to show for what it paid.

If you were the administration that launched such a war, and you understood these dynamics, what would you do? Even if you knew, up front or deep down, that the war couldn’t be won, would you bring the troops home?

Not likely. Were you to do so, you would have to take the entire blame for the failure, with no room for face-saving or rationalization. Most people wouldn’t be able to face such unarguable personal failure. Instead, consciously or unconsciously, such an administration would seek to defer the withdrawal to a successor administration. Doing so would obscure the administration’s personal and historical culpability for the war: members would always be able to say, “We could have won if our successors hadn’t lost their nerve… we were so close to X turning point.” And who could “prove” them wrong?

Instead, I expect such an administration would continue the war, trying to keep US casualties at more or less the levels the public had already proven willing to accept. Periodically, the administration would announce “turning points,” the achievement of which would tell us that we are indeed on the road to victory. As each previously declared turning point is reached and revealed to have no effect on the course of the war, the administration would articulate a new one, thereby maintaining the public’s hope that there is still some purpose to the enterprise, that the war can still be won. Simultaneously, the sunk costs of the war would be increasing, deepening the society’s need to win somehow to justify the increasing costs.

This is a potent political combination: (i) non-worsening casualty levels; (ii) constant infusion of new hope; (iii) increasing sunk costs. Because this combination is relatively stable while the pain of a “we can’t win” acknowledgment gets worse the longer the war drags on, the combination would prevail for a long time. Eventually, the war could be passed on to the next administration. Blame for losing it could be passed on as well, or at least shared and obscured.

At some point, during the tenure of the administration that launched the war or of one of its successors, the war will have dragged on long enough to cause the society to conclude that victory isn’t possible. It’s not so much that the pain of what has been spent becomes overwhelming; rather, it’s the sense of nothing but further pain ahead, for no possible gain, that would bring about a new consensus on the war. Vietnam illustrates the point. I don’t think what happened was, “We’ve lost 58,000 Americans and that’s enough.” It was more, “We’ve lost 58,000, and even with another 58,000 I still don’t see how we can win this.” In other words, the pain of acknowledging failure was finally outweighed by the prospect of more pain for no gain. When a society reaches this point, it abandons the war.

In trying to articulate these dynamics, I’ve deliberately avoided mention of current events. Sometimes you can see more clearly by taking a step back from the matter at hand. But obviously I do think what I’ve described above applies to the Bush administration and Iraq. Maybe the question isn’t just, “Is the war winnable?”, but rather, “Even if it’s not winnable, what will the administration and our society do then?” It’s that second question I’m trying to answer.

Thanks for indulging me. I know this isn’t usually a political forum. Sarah’s thinking, “Last guest appearance for you, my over-caffeinated friend…”

🙂

— Barry